STORY AND INSTITUTES
OF
ROMAN LAW.

OUTLINE SKETCH
FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
With two introductory Articles.

A. H. F. LEFROY.

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This Outline has been prepared for distribution among students of the University of Toronto attending lectures on the History and Institutes of Roman law, as a synopsis or plan of the matter to be covered in the lectures, and with the especial object of displaying the principal Latin terms in use, for the better explanation of which a short Glossary has been added. Two introductory Articles are added which it is hoped will be found useful.

A. H. F. L.

September 1st, 1907.
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PREFATORY NOTE.

The interest and utility of the study of—

(i) the history and development of Roman law;

(ii) the finished product as preserved in the Institutes and the Digest and Code of the Emperor Justinian (A.D. 534):—

(i) A most important chapter in the history of human progress and civilization.

The Romans were the first people to develop a true conception of private law, and construct a logical and complete legal system. (See introductory Articles, *infra*.)

(ii) In studying Roman law we are studying the common law of Europe as well as the basal law of many British colonies, such as Quebec, the Cape, etc.

The finished product has in itself great intrinsic merit:

(α) exact terminology and definition of legal conceptions;

(β) high analytical power;

(γ) wealth of legal principles.

International law was based by Grotius (1625) on the principles of the Roman law of nature.

SUGGESTED COURSE OF READING.

(i) Chapter 44 of Gibbon's Decline and Fall.

(ii) Historical Introduction to Moyle's Institutes of Justinian.

(iii) Article on Roman Law in the last edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.

(iv) Historical Introduction to Sohm's Institutes (Ledlie's translation).

(v) Leage's Roman Private Law.

(vi) Sandar's Justinian.

(vii) Sohm's Institutes (Ledlie's translation).

The student who wishes to study as a whole the Roman Private Law, as it was in the times of Cicero and the Antonines, will find it set forth discursively, but concisely, in Professor Roby's work on that subject: (Cambridge University Press, 1902).

ROMAN LAW

[Reprinted from the University Magazine, December, 1908].

THE object of the present article is to discuss the question how far it is worth while to study the history and the completed system of Roman law; and, as preliminary thereto, it behoves us to consider briefly what law really is. Now if anyone who had not previously considered the question were asked what he understood by law, the probability is that he would first of all think of statute law; he would think of acts of the legislature; but, in fact, statute law forms a very small and even now an almost insignificant part of the whole law. The activity of legislatures is a modern phenomenon, and statute law is but a small part of the law of Rome. The law is a general term to express the infinite number of rules and principles which the courts apply to the various relations and transactions into which people enter. These innumerable rules and principles come from several different sources, but very few of them come from statutes.

Now, in studying the history of Roman law as ordinarily understood, we have to deal with a period of about a thousand years, during which such a system of law was built up and developed. The history of Roman law for our purposes may be said to extend from the year B.C. 451, when what are known as the Twelve Tables are supposed to have been drawn up, to the middle of the sixth century of our era, when Justinian compiled the Digest, the Code, and the Institutes, which have been long known as the Corpus Juris. During that period the law of Rome developed from the mere customs and usages of a small community living in a very small territory on the banks of the Tiber,—a territory not more than about thirty miles long by about twelve miles broad at the broadest part,—into a system of law fitted to be, and which in fact was, for a time, the law of the whole of the civilized world. For the Roman Empire did in its day comprise the whole of the civilized world.

Edmund Burke in his "Abridgement of English History" says: "What can be more instructive than to search out the first obscure and scanty fountains of that jurisprudence which now waters and enriches whole nations with so abundant and copious a flood; to observe the first principles of right springing up, involved in superstition and polluted by violence, until by length of time and favourable circumstances it has worked itself into clearness."

He is referring to English law, but what he says is equally applicable to the history of the law of Rome; and more than that, in studying the history of Roman law we are engaged in studying

a very important chapter in the history of civilization. The Romans were in truth the first people who ever evolved an adequate conception of the true nature of private law, by private law being meant the law regulating the relations and transactions between private individuals, as distinguished from the law regulating the relations between the State and individuals in the State.

Now, if we look at primitive systems of law, other than the Roman,—systems which have never been influenced by the work done by Rome,—we find that they consist either of customs and usages much intermixed with, and affected by, religious ideas and superstitions, or else of rules imposed by the law-maker mainly for the purpose of restraining acts of violence and wrong. The Romans rose at last to a different conception of what law should be, namely, that it should be an intellectual fabric of rules and principles based on an analysis of the relations and transactions into which men enter in the business of life in their juridical aspect: that is to say, with a view to discovering the rights and obligations expressed or implied in them, which are to be arrived at by a process of reasoning, in the light of justice, common-sense, expediency, and public policy. In other words, private law is a thing which has to be rather discovered than imposed by the legislature. Such a conception of law, and the working of it out into a completed system, was Rome's great contribution to the intellectual life of the world, and so in the study of her law we are studying one of the main manifestations of the national life and character of that great people, and it goes without saying, therefore, that the study of Roman law will throw a light upon her history.

Now, if we turn to consider the legal system of Rome as ultimately developed, we find that it has to begin with, great intrinsic merits. This, in truth, is only what might be expected. Let us consider for a moment how keen in modern days is the competition among rival careers for the talent and intellect of each generation. Many of our cleverest men we find immersed in commerce, or presiding over the great financial institutions by and through which the extreme commercial development of modern times is carried on. Others devote themselves to literature and the arts. Others again devote themselves to the political life of the age, which has arisen from the development of democratic institutions, and which had no parallel at Rome. During the greater part of Roman history there were but two careers which offered any great inducement to a well-born Roman of high talents. The one was the military career and the other was the pursuit of the law. It is true that during a short period at the commencement of the Empire—during what is known as the Augustan era—there was a great efflorescence of literature, but the Augustan era soon came to an end, and what had been true before was even more true during the latter part of the first century of the Empire, and the whole of the

second century, which constitute what is called the classical period of Roman law, the period during which the most distinguished of her jurists lived and worked. During the Imperial period a man of talent, says Sir Henry Maine, "might become a teacher of rhetoric, a commander of frontier posts, or a professional writer of panegyrics. The only other walk of active life which was open to him was the practice of the law. Through that lay the approach to wealth, to fame, to office, to the council chamber of the monarch—it might be to the very throne itself." And again Sir Henry Maine says: "The English law has always enjoyed even more than its fair share of the disposable ability of the country; but what would it have been if besides Coke, Somers, Hardwicke, and Mansfield it could have counted Locke, Newton, and the whole strength of Bacon—nay even Milton and Dryden among its chief luminaries,"—the implication being, of course, that such a state of things as he here suggests would in truth have been the case at Rome.

And the respect with which, as might be expected, the Romans regarded their law was itself conducive to the attainment of a high standard. "I consider this little Code," says Cicero, referring to the Twelve Tables, "worth all the libraries of the philosophers." And in the definitions at the commencement of Justinian's Institutes we find Ulpian, one of the greatest of the jurists, defining jurisprudence as, "the knowledge of things human and divine, the science of the just and the unjust";—a definition, indeed, which has no scientific value because it confuses religion and morality with law properly so called, but which nevertheless indicates the high plane upon which Ulpian placed the law. And we are told that the Grand Pontiff Scaevola rebuked Servius Sulpicius, the rival and friend of Cicero, when he expressed himself at a loss for the proper solution of some legal question, by saying: "It is shameful for a patrician and a noble to be ignorant of the law which governs him."

And so it is that we find Roman law spoken of in the highest terms of eulogy by those who have been most competent to pronounce upon its merits. Thus, Sir Matthew Hale, the great Chief Justice of the first half of the seventeenth century, it is recorded, often said that the true grounds and reasons of law were so well delivered in the Digest, that a man could never understand law as a science so well as by seeking it there. And Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the great Roman jurists, refers to their force and elegance of expression, their rectitude of moral view, their immunity from prejudice, their sound and masculine sense and their sensibility to analogies. Rivier, a famous Belgian professor, says that, "It is the union of logic and subtlety which make Roman law the model law". Maine again tells us that: "The Roman jurisprudence throws into definite and concise form of words a variety of legal conceptions which are necessarily realized by English lawyers, but

which at present are expressed differently by different authorities and always in vague and general language." Austin, who flourished and lectured in the middle of the last century, declares that: "Turning from the study of the English to the study of Roman law you escape from the empire of chaos and darkness to a world which seems by compar son the region of order and light:" words which, happily, owing largely to the work of Austin himself, are by no means so just and true, so far as Engl'sh law is concerned, as they were when they were written. English law of that day might well be described as "chaos tempered by Fisher's Digest."

Lastly, to mention one with whose name all lawyers are familiar, and who is certainly up to date, Sir Frederick Pollock writes that: "The original authorities of the Roman system are, compared with our own, compendious, and a moderate amount of systematic application under proper guidance will give a man a range of legal ideas more complete in itself and more conducive to orderly thinking than he is likely to get from any other form of legal study at present practicable."

But there is another and quite different point of view from which the study of Roman law may be commended, and one which may appeal to many minds more strongly than anything already advanced. In one of the Preliminary Constitutions, as they are called, to his compilations, which is called the Constitution 'Tanta,' Justinian, who is never over modest, says: "The whole frame of Roman law being thus set forth and completed in three divisions, namely, one of the Institutions, one of the Digest or Pandects, and, lastly, one of the Constitutions. . . we offer this work with dutiful intent to God Almighty for the preservation of mankind." Little could Justinian, or his great lieutenant Tribonian, have known when those words were penned how well future ages would justify the claim which they were making. It has been truly said that with the exception of the Bible, there has been no book which has so profoundly affected Western Civilization as the Corpus Juris of Justinian.

The whole of the civilized world, or at least the whole of the progressive nations of the western world, have one of two systems as the basis of their law: they have either the common law of England or the Civil Law, which is derived directly from the Roman law. In studying the Roman we are studying the basal law of Europe, more or less modified, indeed, by national or local family customs or land customs, or by modern legislation. When the Germanic invaders overran the Western Roman Empire at the end of the fifth century of our era, they by no means desired to impose their German customs upon their Gallo-Roman subjects, or to expel the law under which the latter were living. Such a policy would have been contrary to the ideas of the age. In those times law was looked upon as personal, not as territorial. In these days

we look upon law as territorial, that is to say, we look upon law as a system to which every one living in a given country is subject. But in the period of which I am now speaking people looked upon law as something which a man, as it were, carried about with him. Everybody, when brought before a magistrate, had a right to appeal to his own law. Consequently the Germanic conquerors of the Western Empire not only recognised the right of the subject people to live under their own laws but actually had codes of Roman law prepared for their benefit, of which the most famous was the Code of Alaric, King of the Visigoths, which was compiled about the year A.D. 506 and which is the most famous of all such codes because of its extent and because of the great influence which it had in succeeding ages.

Now this personal view of the law we find existing up to the tenth century. Up to that time we find the accused claiming from the magistrate that he should be judged according to his own law. After the tenth century this idea passed away. People have become fused together, law has become territorial, and the juridical aspects of what had previously been the Roman province of Gaul is this, that in the south Roman law prevails, while in the north Germanic custom prevails, but even in the most Germanized regions there is an admixture of Roman principles. In the twelfth century took place what has been called a great legal renaissance. Famous schools of law were established at Bologna and Pavia and other places. The compilations of Justinian were submitted to the most careful study. More and more an idea developed and spread that Roman law must be regarded as the common law everywhere, and that its principles should be recognized as everywhere binding. We must remember that when in the beginning of the ninth century Germany's Emperor was crowned by the Pope he claimed to be the successor of Augustus; and the Holy Roman Empire, which has been described as "that majestic fiction which dominated the middle ages," claimed to be a new Rome. The natural corollary, therefore, was that the law of old Rome must also be the law of new Rome. In the country which is now known as Germany, indeed, all traces of Roman civilization was at first extirpated. But in the middle ages there came about a very striking event in the history of law, namely, the reception of Roman law en bloc by Germany, a reception which culminated in 1495 by a decree of the Emperor, when founding the great tribunal of the Imperial Chamber, by which he enjoined the judges and assessors to make the Roman law one of the principal sources of their decisions. In Italy the law of Theodosius at first, and the law of Justinian subsequently, were continuously taught and applied.

Then again it must be remembered that Roman law was the law of the Church, and all affairs of which she had the administration were regulated by what came to be called the Canon Law,

which was Roman law modified in accordance with the spirit of Christianity and of the Church.

The result is found to be that at the basis of the legal systems, not only of Germany, but of all the countries of Western Europe, which arose out of what had once been the Roman Empire, is found the civil law. Not only is the civil law, or Roman law, the basis of the legal system of Italy, of Greece and of the rest of South-Eastern Europe so far as it is Christian, of Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, France, Germany, and the German and Slavonic parts of Austria, the Hungarian Monarchy and all Belgium and Holland,—but the leading principles of Roman law prevail also in the adjoining countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Hungary.

Strange to say the only exception to this condition of things in Western Europe is England. It may well seem strange that it should be so, for England was under Roman occupation for a period of nearly four hundred years, ending with A.D. 410. And moreover as to the great revival of the study of Roman law of which I have spoken, the study of it in England dates from a much earlier time than in any Continental country except Italy. Vacarius, the Lombard, a great jurist, was we are told brought over to England by Archbishop Theobald and taught law at Oxford about the year 1150. Roman law was, in fact, received as authoritative in England, as it was in the rest of Europe, up to the time of Bracton, the greatest of the early text writers of English law, at the end of the thirteenth century. After that, however, owing to the growing jealousy of foreign influence, and especially of the influence of the Pope and of the Emperor, the opinion of the courts and lawyers in England turned against the Roman law. Judges even denied the authority of Bracton on account of the great intermixture of Roman law to be found in his book. In after ages a certain introduction of the principles of Roman law into English law took place in the earlier decisions of the Court of Chancery; and also in commercial law, under the influence largely of Lord Mansfield, who presided over the Court of Queen's Bench in the middle of the eighteenth century, and whose name will always be associated with the development of commercial law in England. But in the main England was destined in the development of her legal system to show the same extraordinary individuality and originality which she has shown in many other directions; and for the most part what there is of Roman law in English law was received before the time of Bracton, or else relates to the law of personal property, marriage and divorce, legacies and wills of personal property generally, and the law of intestacy of personal property. It is to be found in these last owing to the fact that jurisdiction over such matters rested in the hands of the ecclesiastical courts, until their jurisdiction was, at the time of the creation of the Court of Probate in the year 1857, transferred to secular courts. Now the ecclesias-

tical courts of course administered the canon law, and the canon law, as already explained, was derived from the civil law. Only two courts in England to-day, and those of very limited jurisdiction, admit the authority of the Digest, namely: the Ecclesiastical Courts and the Court of Admiralty. It is otherwise indeed in Scotland, and there, at least after the establishment of the Court of Session by King James the Fifth in 1532, the civil law was definitely received.

Thus we see that Gibbon, in the celebrated 44th Chapter of his 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,' was fully justified in writing in his somewhat gorgeous style: "The vain titles of the victories of Justinian are crumbled into dust, but the name of the legislator is inscribed on a fair and everlasting monument. Under his reign and by his care, the civil jurisprudence was digested in the immortal works of the Code, the Pandects, and the Institutes. The public reason of the Romans has been silently or studiously transfused into the domestic institutions of Europe; and the laws of Justinian still command the respect and obedience of independent nations." As was said by Portalis, one of the great French jurists who were concerned in the drawing up of the Code Napoleon, "Rome subjected Europe by her arms, she civilized it by her laws." Or again, as has been epigrammatically expressed, even after her fall Rome continued to rule not *ratione imperii*—by reason of imperial power—but *imperio rationis*—by the imperial power of reason.

But we may come nearer home, and we shall find that in all the non-European colonies which at one time belonged to France or Holland, such as the State of Louisiana, and such as Ceylon and British Guiana, the civil law, or what is known as Roman-Dutch law, is to be found. The same is true of the regions which formerly obeyed Spain or Portugal, namely Mexico, Central America, South America, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands.

Lastly, in our own Quebec we find the civil law. The law of Quebec is for the most part to be found in her Civil Code. Two-thirds of that code is a recension of the Code Napoleon, all in fact, except the part relating to commercial law. The commercial law of Quebec is derived partly from French and partly from English law. It is, so to speak, an eclectic system, and so far as derived from French law it runs back, as already shown, to the civil law. The rest of her Civil Code is virtually the Code Napoleon, and the Code Napoleon, Sir Henry Maine tells us, "may be described without inaccuracy as a compendium of the rules of Roman law then practised in France, cleared of all feudal admixture, such rules, however, being in all cases taken with the extensions given to them and the interpretations put upon them by one or two eminent French jurists and particularly by Pothier." And to-day the writings of Pothier and Dumoulin are great authorities in the Quebec Courts.

Lastly, in Roman law we are studying the principles of that great system, which is daily rising more and more into importance and recognition, known as international law. When in 1625 Grotius laid the foundation of modern international law in his great work 'De Bello et Pace' he looked to those principles of law which the Roman jurists derived from what they called the law of nature, to find principles which might be advanced to govern the relations of independent nations. So Sir Henry Maine tells us: "If International law be not studied historically, if we fail to comprehend, first, the influence of certain theories of the Roman juriconsults on the mind of Hugo Grotius, and next the influence of the great book of Grotius on international jurisprudence, we lose at once all chance of comprehending that body of rules which alone protects the European Commonwealth from permanent anarchy, we blind ourselves to the principles by conforming to which it coheres, we can understand neither its strength nor its weakness, nor can we separate those arrangements which can safely be modified from those which cannot be touched without shaking the whole fabric to pieces."

For these reasons we may firmly maintain that time and attention devoted to the study of the history of Roman law, and of its completed system as set out in its elements in Justinian's Institutes, will not be wasted. The Institutes were intended, as Justinian himself says, for the youth eager for instruction in law. But at the same time he gave the book the force of statute, thereby placing it on a higher level than any ordinary text book can occupy. The student will probably be surprised when he finds how little there is that can be called archaic, much less barbaric, in it. It is in truth a fabric of pure reason, and its principles are for the most part as applicable to the legal problems of to-day as they were when they were formulated.

A. H. F. Lefroy.

ROME AND LAW.

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The student of Roman law and its literature finds his subject referred to in terms of the highest eulogy by eminent writers. If, however, he asks, what precisely did the Romans do to entitle them to the name of the greatest juridical people of antiquity; what, if anything, did the Romans really initiate in the matter of law? he will not easily find a clear and specific answer to the question. In the answer to that question, however, lies the true interest and value of the history of Roman law.

Perhaps it might be thought a sufficient reply to say that the Romans were—as in fact they were—the first to perfect a completed system of private law. I think, however, we may go deeper than that; and shall find that the true and great achievement of the Romans, and what alone enabled them to perfect a completed system, was that they were the first people who ever arrived at a correct conception of private law. Doubtless the Greeks would have anticipated them in this, had the external circumstances of Greek life, and the composition of their law courts, been favorable to the development of a scientific conception and system of law. But, in fact, they were not; and this field of intellectual achievement, at any rate, Greece had to leave for Rome to cultivate.

It is, then, my object in the present article to maintain the following proposition,—that the true interest of the study of the history of Roman law lies in this, that the Romans, through their national practical intelligence, stimulated by external circumstances, and also ultimately by the philosophical theory of a 'law of nature' as they conceived it, developed a system of private law which did in fact answer to the true nature of private law, and that they were the first people who did develop such a system. If this be so, then in the history of Roman law we have an important chapter of the history of human development; the history of the growth to maturity of a conception of the utmost value to the welfare of mankind; the history of a great step onward in the march of the human mind, yet one which has been strangely neglected in professed histories of civilization.

'The true nature of private law' is an expression which certainly demands explanation. By private law is here meant that portion of the law of a State which deals, directly or indirectly, with the mutual relations and transactions of private individuals *inter se*. By the true nature of private law is meant neither more nor less than the nature which such private law would have if the legislator were perfectly wise. If any justification is demanded for calling this the

'true nature' of private law, it is perhaps sufficient to appeal to the view which the common use of language supports, that the most perfect development of anything is a development in accordance with its true nature, and that anything which derogates from the perfection of such development is an infringement upon and interference with its true nature. We need not go deeper and cite in support metaphysical theories of the Stoic, or other philosophies, or appeal to religious beliefs as to the divine ordering of the universe. Not, of course, that it is meant that any one can dogmatically assert what the different rules of private law would be if the legislator were perfectly wise, but only that it is possible to discern very clearly what the general nature of private law would be in such a case.

It is surely clear that, in the first place, its rules and principles would be co-extensive with all the transactions and relations into which men in society enter, permitting, and, so far as necessary, regulating or restraining them, but ignoring none, except such as public policy requires to be deliberately left outside the range of legal cognizance. That is to say, all relations and transactions of mankind which can be wisely dealt with at all by the legislator should be within the purview of the law. In the second place, the law should be as simple and natural as it may be without permitting such a degree of looseness as unduly to facilitate fraud or mistake; —that is to say, law should, so far as in this sense possible, recognize the natural ways of doing business, and the natural ways of entering into relations, whether business relations or other,—such ways as people spontaneously adopt when not obliged to conform to any express legal requirements. And if these should be the characteristics of private law as properly conceived of, so also as to the methods of its development we may say with confidence that the proper method is by a process of juridical analysis of the transactions and relations of mankind, or, in other words, by the discovery of the true nature of those transactions and relations from a juridical point of view, with the object, that is, of bringing to light the reciprocal rights and obligations between the parties to such transactions and relations in the light of reason, justice, common sense, and public policy. Private law should consist, in the main,[1] of rules thus elicited for the governance and regulation of such transactions and relations by the tribunals of the country, from which other rules may be deduced by a process of reason and analogy, and thus a completed system of law ultimately built up. Now the Romans were the first people who attained to such a con-

[1] Some rules there will be which cannot be the result of any such juridical analysis, just as there are some actions which are neither moral nor immoral, but simply unmoral. Such is the rule of the road so far as the law takes cognizance of it; or our legal rule that a will must have two witnesses, and not one only or three. These are rules relating to matters which it is better to regulate one way or another, but in the regulation of which no juridical question, strictly speaking, arises.

ception of law, as distinguished from systems consisting mainly either of usages and customs, more or less arbitrary or fortuitous and implicated with religious ideas and superstitions, or of regulations imposed at will by the legislator. And so says Sir Henty Maine: 'The rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their usages were first consolidated into a systematic form . . . . I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be superior to the law of the Hindoos, unless the theory of natural law had given it a type of excellence different from the usual one.'

In order, then, to show that the Romans did arrive at such a conception of private law, and in briefest outline the process by which they did so, it is necessary in the first place to glance at the legal condition of things as it presents itself to us in the earliest period of Roman history. This period we may take as extending from the foundation of the Republic, or from the supposed date of the Twelve Tables, to the first quarter of the third century, B.C., when Rome had completed the conquest of central and southern Italy, and before she had commenced the acquisition of those provinces which afterwards composed the Roman Empire.

Now, it is no doubt true that at the earliest moment when the light of history dawns upon the scene, the Romans showed in matters of law a condition in advance of that reached by other primitive people. One may point in illustration to the fact that the predominance of the State over the *Gentes* or the clan-groups was apparently firmly established; that the institution of private ownership had been developed; that 'the conventional language of symbols' had very largely disappeared, and given place in all transactions regulated by law to a direct expression of the will of the parties. But, on the other hand, we find a condition of things still very archaic and indicating little or no conception of the true nature of law. In the first place we see that the law was personal, not extending to all dwellers in Roman territory, but only applying to Roman citizens and to such outlanders as might belong to the favoured communities to which by treaty the privileges of Roman private law had been more or less widely extended, or who might have had personal privilege extended to them in that respect. In the second place, we see all that important branch of private law which governs the family relations treated of in the most primitive way, all the members of the family being left under the despotic control of the head of the family, unable to enter into any private transaction, whether marriage or any other, in legally binding fashion, save under his direction, or as his representatives, and incapable of acquiring or owning property in their own right and on their own behalf.

Then, as to the methods of the law for the carrying through of such transactions as the law did recognize, they were highly artificial as distinguished from natural,—as distinguished, that is, from those which people are likely to adopt if not interfered with by legal regulation. Thus, if the Roman citizen wished to contract a marriage in the methods then in vogue, he had to go through either an elaborate religious ceremony or else a secular ceremony modelled on a transaction of sale for the carrying out of which the presence of five witnesses was required, and that of a functionary known as a scale-holder, who was in truth a survival of the days when, the medium of exchange being raw copper, a sale involved a weighing out of the required quantity. If he wanted to make a sale of a landed estate and the appurtenances, he had to go through a similar ceremony with the 'copper and the scales'; while as to personal property generally, it is still a moot point how soon law recognized at all absolute ownership in it, although when it did so, here at least the simple method of delivery by the vendor of the goods, accompanied by payment by the purchaser, with the intention of transferring the property, sufficed. So, too, if the Roman citizen wished to make or receive a legally binding loan of money, the inevitable copper and the scales had to be resorted to, followed by the barbarous remedy of personal bondage, permitted to the creditor against the debtor who was in default, in the absence of any regulated system either of execution against property or of relief for insolvent debtors. Again, if the purpose was to make a will, unless in case of a soldier on active service—either it had to be done by application to the legislative assembly—the *Comitia Curiata*—resulting in something analogous to what we would call a private Act, or else it had to take the form of a sale by the intending testator, with the copper and the scales and with five witnesses, of his estate to a friend, who on his decease would be ultimately required, under a provision of the Twelve Tables, to recognize the appointed heir or heirs, against whom legatees and creditors could make their claims. But no recognition of testamentary trusts was given by the law, we are told, until the commencement of the Empire; nor were trusts *inter vivos*, which have so prominent a place in our own social and legal arrangements, ever, it would seem, recognized among the Romans. Again, if a citizen made no will and died intestate, the claims of affection and blood relationship were ruthlessly set aside as against all who did not come within the agnatic circle, from which were excluded all descendants in the female line, as well as any son or grandson who had been emancipated by the intestate from his paternal authority, and any daughter who had contracted marriage in either of the ways above referred to.

And not only were the methods alone recognized by the law highly artificial and ceremonious, they were also very restricted in

number. The evidence tends to show that the law had no recognition of such transactions as the simple contract of sale, or of hire, or of deposit or pledge, and that in fact, with two exceptions of very limited application, (namely, a formal contract whereby one might bind himself to provide a dowry for a daughter or granddaughter on her marriage, or to be responsible as a surety for the fulfilment by another of some undertaking), the only juristic acts recognized by the law, in the early period, were the sale by *mancipatio* (the technical name of the transaction with the copper and the scales above mentioned) and the contract of loan known as the *nexum*, involving a like ceremony, and such applications of these methods to transactions to which they in their origin had no reference,—such as emancipation of children or of slaves, adoption, and the forms of marriage and will-making already referred to,—as the jurists were able ingeniously to devise. Expecially we notice that there was no recognition by the law in any true sense of a contract of agency whereby one acting for another might render the latter liable to a third party without being liable himself, a contract upon which so much of the business of modern life depends.

And again, in the case of such obligations as the law did lend binding force to, we read that the strictest interpretation, or what was called *strictum jus*, was applied. As a man had spoken, so was he held to be bound, and, so far as appears, there was but one form of contract in respect to the enforcement of which equitable considerations were admitted, namely, the method of giving security on property known as the *mancipatio cum fiducia*. And as regards legal procedure, the forms of action were few in number, involved the utmost technicality and ceremoniousness, and were conducted in the rigidly technical and narrow spirit which characterizes legal procedure of an archaic type.

And while such were what one may call the positive institutions of the law, there is also no indication of any recognition of the fact that private law in its true nature consists not so much of rules imposed from above, or by the tyranny of custom or of religion, as of rules deduced by the process of analysis and explication of human transactions and relations above referred to. Thus scarcely any instances seem forthcoming of the law recognizing implied obligations. One apparent exception may be pointed to in the warranty of quiet possession accompanying sale by the copper and the scales, but as to that the most approved view now would seem to be that it was not a case of implied warranty, but arose out of express words of the vendor. For the rest, a recognition by the law of the obligation of a guardian honestly to administer the estate of his ward would seem to be almost the only example of legal obligation arising out of a relation of this kind.

The last two centuries and a half of the Republic, especially the latter half of that period, unquestionably saw a notable develop-

ment and expansion of the law at Rome. We see some deliberate recognition of the claims of equity and justice in modification of the immemorial rules of the *jus civile*, or, as we might say, of the old common law. Perhaps the most notable example is what is known as the Publician edict, wherein were recognized the equitable claims of a *bona fide* purchaser, and—as against all but the true owner—even though his vendor had, in fact, no title to the property sold. The same tendency operating upon the old common law appears also at this period in the just modification of the law of prescription, or *usucapio*, by requiring that one should have become possessor *bona fide*, and as the result of some legitimate transaction, such as sale or gift, if time was to run in his favour and he was to acquire full legal ownership upon lapse of the necessary period.

We see, too, at this time recognition of the natural claims of blood relationship, in matters of succession to property, secured by the prætorian institution of *bonorum possessio*, whereby, although the prætor could not by his edict transfer the legal inheritance from the common law heir to another, yet he could and did put another, if entitled by nearness of blood relationship, into possession of the estate, and protect him in that possession, until by length of time legal ownership had accrued to him, in defiance of many of the rigid and narrow rules of agnatic succession. So, too, we see another use of this *bonorum possessio* in the simplification of the law of wills by the establishment of the prætorian will, which required only the presence of seven seals, and did not require evidence of the actual carrying out of the ceremony of the copper and scales, although this prætorian will did not apparently acquire validity as against the *jus civile* heir, if the latter could prove defects in the accompanying mancipatory ceremony, until an edict of Marcus Aurelius in the latter part of the second century of our era. It was towards the close of the Republic, also, that Roman law, in the words of Sohm, contrived to accomplish a veritable masterpiece of juristic ingenuity in discovering the notion of a collective person; in clearly grasping, and distinguishing from its members, the collective whole as the ideal unity of the members bound together by the corporate condition; in raising the whole to the rank of a person (a juristic person, namely) and in securing it a place in private law as an independent subject of proprietary capacity standing on the same footing as other private persons.

But in the main it seems evident that the legal expansion of Rome in this period is to be ascribed to the growth of a broader system of law, alongside of the old common law, which was applicable not only to Roman citizens, but to all free men at Rome. It seems agreed that this was in the main, in the first instance, a recognition by the prætors of existing mercantile customs and methods, practically forced upon them by the increasing numbers of alien traders and residents at Rome, which followed the great

expansion of commerce incident to the final defeat of Carthage and to the spread of Roman dominion over the countries subsequently constituting her Mediterranean provinces. These mercantile usages would inevitably be characterized by simplicity and by the ready recognition of common equity and justice, being the outgrowth of the ways which business men naturally adopt of doing business. The four contracts which became recognized during this period as legally obligatory upon the mere consent of the parties to them, contrary to all the traditions of the Roman law,—which regarded such mere consent, unaccompanied by any formal ceremony or fixed legal formulæ, as mere *nudum pactum*,—indicate on their face the probability that their recognition was the outcome of commercial necessities. They were the contracts of sale, letting and hire, partnership, and agency or mandate. The same may be said of the four contracts *re*, that is, accompanied by the delivery of something, which are believed to have first obtained legal recognition in this epoch, namely, the *mutuum*, or simple loan of money without any ceremony of the copper and the scales, the *commodatum*, or contract of gratuitous loan for use, the *depositum*, or contract of gratuitous deposit, and the contract of simple pledge by delivery over of property with that object.

To trade, also, it would seem probable that we may attribute the establishment of what is known as the literal contract, whereby entries in ledgers of receipts and disbursements, made with the consent of the party debited, were held to constitute binding obligations; and whereby by means of cross entries the advantages of negotiability were secured at a time before the invention of what we call negotiable instruments. Part of the advantages of this contract, moreover, lay in the fact that once formed it was *stricti juris*, or in other words the party liable was strictly held by it, and could not plead, as against its enforcement, equitable considerations existing before or arising after it.

On the other hand, all the other contracts above mentioned were what were called *bonæ fidei* contracts, or in other words their legal enforcement was permitted only subject to all proper considerations of justice and equity as between the parties. It is obvious what an opening this left for the legal recognition of implied obligations; as did also the principle of Roman law said to have been recognized in this period that no one must be enriched at the cost of another's injury. This establishment of *bonæ fidei* actions marks a most important liberalization of the law, inasmuch as under the old *jus civile* it is believed that there was only one contract which was in this sense *bonæ fidei*, namely, the *mancipatio cum fiducia*.

The characteristics, then, of this new system of law that had grown up alongside of the old national common law at Rome, were greater naturalness and simplicity, and more recognition of justice and equity, as distinct from a spirit of rigid technicality, cere-

moniousness, and artificiality; and we find indications of Roman lawyers arriving at a generalization in respect of such tendencies and characteristics in the fact that, apparently about the time of Cicero, a new word came into vogue to indicate this portion of the legal system, namely, '*jus gentium*,' or, as we might say, 'universal law,' —a name which indicates the recognition of the fact that the distinguishing feature of this new law, available to all free men, was that it had a certain universal character, as contrasted with a local, tribal, narrowly national character.

But the important thing for our present purpose is to notice that in the main this development of law at Rome in a right and true direction was not the result of any scientific theory of what private law should be, but rather the outcome of circumstances, and of the absolute necessity of devising rules of law applicable to the transactions of trade and the affairs of the numerous transient or permanent non-citizen residents at Rome. The prætors' edict is evidence of the way in which the Roman magistrates met the necessities of the situation with the practical ability which characterized them; but law was still in its empirical stage, nor was the prætors' edict capable of fully meeting the necessities of legal development, any more than legislation by parliament would be in our own day. In order that the expansion and liberalization of the law should advance uniformly towards the building up of a perfect system, it was necessary that some theory, or ideal, as to the true nature of law in general, should establish itself, and this we shall now see was destined in the fulness of time to come to pass.

This ideal was found, apparently about the beginning of the Empire, in the Stoic conception of a law of nature, which the Roman jurists adopted in their speculations, and applied to matters legal in a way in which the Stoics themselves had never done. The contribution of the Stoics to legal studies 'consisted more in the informing spirit than in any definite conceptions which were borrowed.'[1]

It is not necessary here to dilate at length upon the Stoic theory of a law of nature. At its basis was the belief that there is inherent in the universe at large, and in each individual thing, whether animate or inanimate, a certain nature, which, if allowed to take its proper course, would ultimately lead to the attainment of a perfect development of each thing in its own order. This nature, it was held, was essentially reasonable, its rules embodied the *naturalis ratio*, and reasoning beings could, by exercise of their reason, find out what its dictates were, and their duty was faithfully to follow them. And under this conception, as developed by the jurists, not only is there such a nature of man, of animals, and of every individual physical thing,—there is also 'a nature of every sort of

[1] W. W. Capes, Stoicism, 239-240.

contract, action, and so on. In each and all of these 'natures' an ordinative energy and determinative rule are observable. These are its *naturalis ratio*.'[1] In this conception as applied to law the Roman jurists found an ideal, toward the perfect realization of which in the actual law of the land they steadily pressed during the classical period of Roman law.

Now, the more we study this conception of a law of nature, as applied to the transactions and relations of mankind on the juridical plane, in the dry light of modern reason, the more we are likely to come round to the view of Professor Holland, that laws of nature, in this sense, are merely 'such of the received precepts of morality relating to overt acts, and therefore capable of being enforced by a political authority, as either are enforced by such authority, or are supposed to be fit so to be enforced.'[2] But if the Roman jurists had so regarded it, or spoken of it, it would assuredly never have borne the fruit it bore in the development of law. Their position was by no means merely that of superior persons criticizing the law of the land from the standpoint of their own higher morality. If that had been all, their labours would probably have been as ineffective as the criticisms of superior persons are very apt to be. On the contrary, the jurists attributed, or pretended to attribute, an objective existence and reality to their law of nature. They looked upon it as a veritable *lex*, whose rules were discoverable by reason, and when discovered had an inherent authoritative force, and were in fact the truest and highest law.[3] And if such a view of the law of nature was indeed a misconception, we may at least say that it was the most beneficent misconception which ever occupied the human mind, whether we regard its effect on the development of law, or the functions it discharged during the middle ages, and as the basis of modern international law.

Moreover, it is to be observed that the semi-official position of the Roman certificated jurists, and the *jus respondendi* which they possessed, and the authoritative force of their legal opinions when produced before the *judices* to whom lawsuits were remitted by the prætor, enabled them in large measure to secure the embodiment of their views in the actual law of the land. As it has been concisely expressed, the bar gave the law to the bench at Rome,

[1] Muirhead, Private Law of Rome, 2 ed., 382.

[2] Holland, Jurisprudence, 10 ed., 30.

[3] Mr. Bryce, however, evidently thinks the Roman jurists knew very well the true state of the case. "A modern precisian," he says, "might say that the Romans ought to have called it, not 'the law of nature,' but 'materials supplied by nature for the creation of a law,' a basis for law rather than the law itself. To the Romans, however, such a criticism would probably have seemed trivial. They would, had the distinction been propounded to them, have replied that they knew what the critic meant, and had perceived it already; but that they were concerned with things, not words, and having a practical end in view, were not careful about logical or grammatical minutiæ:" 2 Bryce, Essays on History and Jurisprudence, 152-153.

not the bench to the bar, as with us. The only objection to the phrase is that, strictly speaking, there was no bar and no bench.

The really important thing to notice, however, is that the principles of the law of nature as deduced by the Roman jurists, and the methods of its development in their hands, were entirely in accordance with the true conception of private law as above outlined. 'The conception of nature as a source of law,' says Mr. Bryce, 'found a solid basis for law in the reason and needs of mankind, and it softened the transition from the old to the new, first by developing the inner meaning of the old rules while rejecting their form, extracting the kernel of reason from the nut of tradition, and secondly, by appealing to the common sense and general usage of mankind, embodied in the *jus gentium*, as evidence that nature and utility were really one, the first being the source of human reason, and the latter supplying the ground on which reason worked.'[1] And again, says the same writer, 'Speaking broadly, the law of nature represented to the Romans that which is conformable to reason, to the best side of human nature, to an elevated morality, to practical good sense, to general convenience. It is simple and rational, as opposed to that which is artificial or arbitrary. It is universal, as opposed to that which is local or national. . . . It is natural, not so much in the sense of belonging to men in their primitive and uncultured condition, but rather as corresponding to and regulating their fullest and most perfect social development in communities, where they have ripened through the teachings of reason.'[2]

The characteristics of the speculative Roman *jus naturale*, as Voigt summarizes them, are its potential universal applicability to all men, among all people, and in all ages, and its correspondence with the innate conviction of right; and its leading propositions, the recognition of the claims of blood, the duty of faithfulness to engagements, the apportionment of advantage and disadvantage, gain and loss, according to the standard of equity, and the supremacy of the *voluntatis ratio* over words or forms.[3]

But directly private law was conceived of as a system to be developed by a process of reasoning working upon fundamental principles of justice and common sense, and not as consisting merely of ancient customs and ceremonies, or of rules arbitrarily imposed by authority, a true conception of law had been reached. Herein lay what was indisputably true in the conception of a *lex naturæ*. To conceive of law in this way was the actual achievement of Rome, and when once this idea of law had been attained it was an inestimable addition to the thought of mankind. Many a chapter, little creditable to the history of English law, would have been non-

[1] 2 Bryce, *ibid.*, 156.
[2] 2 Bryce, *ibid*, 151-152.
[3] Das Jus Naturale, 304, 321-323; cited in Muirhead, Private law of Rome, 2ed., 381-382.

existent if such a conception had at all times possessed the minds of judges and of legislators. Until English law had been delivered from the technicalities and artificial logic with which lawyers surrounded the feudal land law, on the one hand, and from the methods of legal administration known as forms of action on the other, it was impossible for it to be placed upon the basis, and developed along the lines on which law had been placed, and which law had attained, in the classical period of Roman jurisprudence. Now, however, if we study our case law, it is clear that a process of development is going on largely, if not altogether, in harmony with the true conception of private law as above unfolded. We have at last attained to the position to which Roman jurists led the way.

Thus we are able to understand the true meaning of a passage in one of Sir Henry Maine's essays which must have puzzled many a student. In his essay on Roman Law and Legal Education, he says: 'It is not because our own jurisprudence and that of Rome were *once* alike that they ought to be studied together; it is because they *will be* alike. It is because all laws, however dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble each other in their maturity; and because we in England are slowly, and perhaps unconsciously and unwillingly, but still steadily and certainly, accustoming ourselves to the same modes of legal thought, and to the same conceptions of legal principle, to which the Roman jurisconsults had attained after centuries of accumulated experience and unwearied cultivation.'[1]

The same idea is to be found expressed in clear and striking language by Sir Frederic Harrison in his articles on the English School of Jurisprudence, published a good many years ago in the *Fortnightly Review*. 'The present generation,' he says, 'has witnessed a really striking phenomenon. This is no less than the re-annexation of the English law on to the great body of principle, of which the Roman law is the basis and the framework. Henceforward the insularity of English law is a thing of the past. . . . English law has worked itself free from whole masses of those feudal anomalies and accidents which in the last century made it seem something so monstrous and hopeless to men trained in the civil law. It never was at any time in so unmethodical a state as was the law of France before the Code Napoleon, or the Roman law in the time of Cicero. But now that much of the old confusion has been cut away, it is seen that the bulk of the English law is entirely comparable to, and in many respects in complete harmony with the bulk of the civil law. The law relating to land, to buildings, and to the settlement of estates, and necessarily the law of succession and wills, is from political causes deeply stamped with the history of its feudal origin. It is this startling and picturesque side of English law which has filled the lawyers of England and of the Continent alike with the conviction that English law is a unique production of

[1] Cambridge Essays for 1856, printed as an appendix to Village Communities in the East and West, 332.

the human mind. But this is merely the historical casing of our law. Behind this feudal accident, when we study it by a sound analysis, it is seen the bulk of the English law, the whole law of contract, the whole commercial law (and this is ever becoming more and more the bulk of the civil law), really, as the old books said, "runs on all fours" with that modified and modernized form of the law of Justinian which is the groundwork of the law of all civilized Europe.'[1]

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[1] 31 Fortnightly Review, 129.

HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW.

Outline of the course of development of Roman Law from the Twelve Tables (B.C. 451) to Justinian's Digest (A.D. 533-4).

FIRST PERIOD.

Regal Rome and its Institutions.

The agnatic family and patria potestas. (Adoptio, Adrogatio, Tutela). The Clients. The Slaves.

The Gentes and Comitia Curiata. The Senate. The Pontiffs. Ager publicus. Ager privatus.

No law except customary law (jus moribus constitutum):

But this supplemented by:—

Fas—a conception of Divine law—the will of the gods, enjoining, *e.g.*, observance of oaths, respect for human life, etc.;

Boni mores—*i.e.*, ordinary morality

(α) either moderating *Jus*, *e.g.*, by restraining exercise of patria potestas;

(β) or supplementing it, *e.g.*, enjoining dutiful obedience and respect to superiors, and fidelity to engagements.

Marriage by confarreatio. The will in Calatis Comitiis and in procinctu. The position of the plebeians.

Servius Tullius and his reforms.

Local tribes. The Centuries. The private Judex. The Court of the Centumviri. The Census. Marriage by coemptio. Conveyance by Mancipium. Res mancipi. Contract of Nexum.

SECOND PERIOD.

B.C. 509. The establishment of the Republic.

494. First secession of the Plebs. Appointment of tribuni plebis.

452. Appointment of Decemviri legibus scribundis.
The object of this measure, and the grievances of the plebeians.

The Twelve Tables of the Law (B.C. 451-450).

General view of their contents and of the law at this period.

Connubium, Commercium, Actio } Summary of rights of Roman citizens.

Capitis deminutio: maxima, media, and minima.

Some special provisions of the Twelve Tables.

1. Succession of the nearest agnate.
2. Recognition of marriage by 'usus.'
3. 'Three consecutive sales of the son by the father releases the former from the patria potestas.' Emancipatio.
4. 'Words pronounced in the ceremonies of the mancipium and nexum shall be law.' Leges mancipi. Lex fiduciæ.
   The will per æs et libram (by the copper and the scales).
5. 'The testament of the father shall be law as to all provisions concerning his property and the tutelage thereof.'
   The heres in Roman law.
6. 'Possession for the period of two years in case of land, of one year in connection with other things shall vest the property.'
   Usucapio, *i.e.*, obtaining title by lapse of time.
7. Provisions as to nexal and judgment debtors.
8. Furtum manifestum and nec manifestum.

The legis actiones. Their general character.

Legis actio per sacramentum (by way of wager).

Legis actio per judicis postulationem (by way of demand for a judge).

Legis actio per manus injectionem (by way of personal arrest).

Legis actio per pignoris capionem (by way of distress).

Legis actio per condictionem (by way of notice to appear before a magistrate).

Lex Silia; lex Calpurnia (dates uncertain).

'Condictio triticaria' for recovery of a thing other than money.

The verbal contract 'sponsio' (stipulatio).

Judicial and quasi judicial procedure outside the legis actiones. Cognitio. Decretum. Interdictum.

B.C. 449. Second secession of the plebs and overthrow of the Decemvirate (The Valerio-Horatian laws. The Comitia tributa).

445. Lex Canuleia (authorising intermarriage between patricians and plebeians).
Military tribunes. Censors appointed (B.C. 443).

367. Lex Licinia restores consuls, and makes agrarian reforms. Establishment of prætorship.

366. First plebeian consul.

326. Lex Poetilia abolishes right of summary imprisonment by creditors on breach of nexal contracts.

304. Jus Flavianum makes public the forms of procedure and the calendar.

300. Lex Ogulnia opens pontificate to plebeians.

287. Third secession of the plebs.

286. Lex Hortensia makes plebiscita universally binding.

275. Defeat of Pyrrhus at Beneventum leaves Rome supreme in central and southern Italy.

THIRD PERIOD.

B.C. 264-241. First Punic War.
First province (Sicily) founded B.C. 241.

B.C. 242. Institution of a Prætor peregrinus.

218-196. Second Punic War.

214-205. The three Macedonian wars.

200. The Jus Ælianum brings law within the knowledge of the laity.

190. Defeat of Antiochus of Syria.

150-146. Third Punic War.
Professional jurists arise.

The development of the law.

Rigour of the jus civile modified by simpler and more equitable rules. Growth of the jus gentium.
Lex Æbutia introducing the formulary system of procedure [c. B.C. 247, Muirhead; B.C. 150, Sohm; B.C. 149-126 Girard].
The jus honorarium, *i.e.*, the law of the edicts of the Prætor (jus prætorium) and of the ædiles. Viva vox juris civilis.
The Publician edict introduces bonitary ownership and the doctrine of bonâ fide possession.
The 'literal' contract.
The four contracts Re.
The four consensual contracts.
Amendments of law of succession by the 'bonorum possessio' of the prætors.

B.C. 90-89. The Social War.

48. Julian Insolvency Act (cessio bonorum).

31. Battle of Actium and commencement of the Empire.

FOURTH PERIOD.

Application of the conception of a 'law of nature' to private law.
The patented jurists and the jus respondendi.
M. Antistius Labeo and Ateius Capito give rise to the rival schools of Proculians and Sabinians.

The jus naturale and its characteristics and leading propositions:—

1. potential universal applicability to all men,
2. among all people,
3. and in all ages;
4. correspondence with the innate conviction of right;
5. recognition of the claims of blood;
6. duty of faithfulness to engagements;
7. apportionment of advantage and disadvantage, gain or loss according to the standard of equity;
8. supremacy of the voluntatis ratio over the words or form in which the voluntas is manifested.

A.D.

4. Lex Ælia Sentia regulating manumission of slaves.

9. Lex Julia et Pappia Poppœa establishes law of 'caduca,' *i.e.*, legacies lapsing from unmarried or childless legatees.

19. Lex Junia Norbana establishes among enfranchised slaves the condition known as Junian Latinity.

A.D. 117-222. Hadrian to Alexander Severus.

131. Hadrian consolidates the Edict.
Maturity of Roman jurisprudence. Succession of great jurists: Salvius Julianus, Pomponius, Gaius, Papinian, Ulpian, Paulus, Modestinus.

214. Caracalla confers citizenship on all free subjects of the Empire.

The development of the law:

The jus militare and 'castrense peculium,' *i.e.*, recognition of soldier's rights in what he acquires when on service, notwithstanding patria potestas.

Disappearance of 'tutela mulierum,' *i.e.*, the perpetual wardship of women.

Recognition of testamentary trusts (fidei-commissa) and of codicils (temp. Augusti).

Development of formulary procedure under the leges Juliæ judiciariæ.

The prevalence of bonæ fidei judicia, *i.e.*, the disposition of legal disputes on equitable principles.

Actiones utiles, *i.e.*, rights of action of the jus civile adapted to cases not properly within them.

Actiones in factum, *i.e.*, actions devised for protection of rights unknown to the jus civile.

Procedure extra ordinem, *i.e.*, outside the usual course.

Prætorian interdicts, and 'in integrum restitutio,' *i.e.*, restoration of parties to their original rights in proper cases.

284. Accession of Emperor Diocletian, and inauguration of despotism of an oriental character.

FIFTH PERIOD.

Period of Codification.

A.D. 320. State recognition of Christianity by Constantine.

Influence of Christianity on the law.

The colonatus, or servitude of the glebe.

Abandonment of the formulary system.

395. Definite severance of Eastern from Western Empire.

426. Theodosian and Valentinian 'law of citations,' recognizing as authoritative writings of certain jurists only.

A.D. 438. Theodosian Code.

476. End of Western Empire.

500-515. Romano-Barbarian Codes.

533-4. Justinian's Digest, Code, and Institutes.

OUTLINE OF THE INSTITUTES.

BOOK I.

Ulpian's definitions:—

(i) 'Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his due.'

(ii) 'Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of the just and unjust.'

(iii) 'The maxims of the law are these: to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give everyone his due.'

Some preliminary divisions of law:—

(i) Publicum Jus.

(ii) Privatum Jus.

(*a*) naturalia præcepta.

(*b*) præcepta gentium.

(*c*) præcepta civilia.

Main divisions of private law:—

(i) The law of Persons.

(ii) The law of Things.

(iii) The law of Actions.

The Law of Persons.

Of slaves and freedmen. Modes of manumitting slaves. The rights of patrons.

Divisions of freeborn citizens into (*a*) those who are dependent (alieni juris: in potestate; in manu; in mancipio); and (*b*) those who are independent (sui juris).

The patria potestas. Marriage. Arrogation. Adoption. Emancipation. Guardianship (tutela).

Capitis deminutio, *i.e.*, loss or change of status (maxima, minor, and minima).

Curatorship of children over fourteen, and of madmen and spendthrifts.

BOOK II.

The Law of Things.

Various divisions of things:—

(i) In patrimonio, *i.e.*, the objects of private property:

(ii) Extra patrimonium, *i.e.*, not the objects of private property:—

(1) communia omnium;

(2) publica;

(3) res universitatis;

(4) res nullius (in bonis):—

(*a*) res sacræ;

(*b*) res religiosæ;

(*c*) res sanctæ;

(i) Corporeal (quæ tangi possunt).

(ii) Incorporeal (quae in jure consistunt).

(i) Res singulae.

(ii) Universitates rerum.

Natural modes of acquiring 'dominium,' *i.e.*, property in individual things (res singulæ):

(i) occupatio;

(ii) accessio;

(1) rerum nullius:—

(*a*) natural increment (*e.g.*, offspring of animals, or produce of land, owned by you);

(*b*) alluvio;

(*c*) island rising in a river;

(*d*) dereliction of river bed:

(2) rerum alienarum

(*a*) adjunctio

(α) inædificatio;

(β) plantatio et satio.

(iii) confusio and commixtio.

(iv) specificatio;

(v) traditio (delivery).

Modes of acquiring individual things under the jus civile:—

(i) usucapio, *i.e.*, acquisition by reason of long possession;

Possession a necessary element of usucapio, together with bona fides, and bonus titulus.

The Roman law of legal possession as distinguished from mere detention.

(ii) donatio (gift): (*a*) mortis câusa; (*b*) inter vivos (including propter nuptias).

Rights by one man over the property of another (jura in re alienâ) *e.g.*, servitudes (easements):

(i) Prædial servitudes

(*a*) Urban;

(*b*) Rural.

(ii) Personal servitudes

(*a*) Usufruct, *i.e.*, right of using and taking fruits;

(*b*) Usus, *i.e.*, right of using only.

Modes of acquisition of property in an aggregate of things (per universitatem):—

(i) By inheritance

(*a*) Under a will;

(*b*) On intestacy.

The making of wills. Jus tripertitum. Military privileges. The disinherison of children. The institution of an heir or heirs (heres). Pupillary substitution, *i.e.*, making an heir for an infant child in case latter dies before puberty.

Undutiful wills (inofficiosa testamenta). Legacies and fideicommissa. Codicils.

B.C. 40. Lex Falcidia secures to the heres a fourth part of the estate notwithstanding legacies.

Gifts of inheritance by way of fideicommissa.

A.D. 62. S. C. Trebellianum gives to and against the fideicommissarius the same actions as if he were the heres.

A.D. 73. S. C. Pegasianum extends the principle of the lex Falcidia to fideicommissa.

BOOK III.

The rules of intestate succession.

Sui heredes, *i.e.*, heirs by their own right. Agnates. Persons placed in the class of sui heredes, or of agnates, by prætorian law and imperial constitutions, *e.g.*, emancipated children; descendants from females, etc. Cognates. Bonorum possessio of prætors.

Reforms of Justinian. Succession in case of freedmen.

A.D. 158. S. C. Tertullianum permits mother to succeed to children.

178. S. C. Orphitianum permits children to succeed to mother.

(ii) Universal succession by adrogation, *i.e.*, succeeding to the estate of one sui juris by reason of having adopted him.

Obligations.

'A tie of law, by which we are so constrained that of necessity we must render something according to the law of our State'; 'a right to require another to do something which is reducible to a money value':—

(i) Obligations ex contractu.

All legally enforcible contracts in Roman law either (i) formal, depending for their validity on compliance with certain formalities; or (ii) 'formless,' but depending on the presence of some causa civilis.

The classes of contract mentioned in the Institutes are:—

(*a*) Re, grounded on delivery of something, *i.e.*, on past-performance:—

(1) loan for consumption (mutuum);

(2) loan for use (commodatum);

(3) deposit;

(4) pledge:

(*b*) Verbis, *i.e.*, by spoken words (stipulatio).

Contracts by sureties (fidei-jussores).

A.D. 46. S. C. Velleianum forbids women to bind themselves as sureties.

(*c*) Litteris, *i.e.*, by written entry. Cautiones.

(*d*) Consensu, *i.e.*, by mere agreement:—

(1) sale (emptio-venditio);

(2) letting and hiring (locatio-conductio;

(3) partnership (societas);

(4) agency (mandatum).

(ii) Obligationes quasi ex contractu
e.g., the obligations between parties one of whom has, without any contract so to do, attended to the other's affairs in his absence (negotiorum gestor); or the liability of heres to legatee, or of guardian to ward.

How obligations are dissolved. Contrarius actus. Novation.

BOOK IV.

(ii) Obligationes ex delicto: *i.e.*, remedial rights and liabilities arising from wrongs recognised as such under the old civil legislation:—

(*a*) theft (furtum) = 'the fraudulent dealing with a thing itself, or with its use or its possession.' Furtum manifestum and furtum nec manifestum;

(*b*) robbery with violence (vi bona rapta);

(*c*) unlawful damage (damnum).

c. B.C. 286. Lex Aquilia establishes actions for unlawful damage.

(*d*) Outrage or affront (injuria).

(iv) Obligationes quasi ex delicto; *e.g.*, liability of an employer for wrongful acts of his servant or agent within the sphere of his employment.

The Law of Actions.

Divisions of actions:—

A.—(i) actions in rem, *i.e.*, not founded on any kind of 'obligatio;'

(ii) actions in personam, *i.e.*, against one or several between whom and the plaintiff there is an 'obligatio:'

B.—(i) actions founded on the jus civile or on particular laws;

(ii) prætorian actions

(*a*) in rem, *e.g.*, actio Publiciana, actio Serviana;

(*b*) in personam, *e.g.*, de pecuniâ constituta; de peculio; de peculio et in rem verso;

(*c*) penal actions:

C.—(i) actiones stricti juris, *i.e.*, where equitable considerations are not admissible.

(ii) actiones bonæ fidei, where equitable considerations are admissible.

e.g., cases where liabilities arise from transactions entered into by one who is under the power of another (in alienâ potestate), *e.g.*, with the manager of a shop (actiones institoriæ) or the captain of a ship (actiones exercitoriæ):

D.—actiones arbitrariæ:

E.—noxal actions.

Defences in actions (exceptiones). Further pleadings.

Criminal Law and Public Prosecutions (publica judicia).

GLOSSARY.[1]

Actio, the right of suing in the Courts for what is due to one. Also, proceedings, or a form of procedure, for the enforcement of such right.

Actio arbitraria, an actio in which the *formula* directed the *Judex*, if he found the plaintiff's claim valid, to make an order that the defendant should make amends to the plaintiff, at the same time fixing the sum that under all the circumstances the defendant ought to pay to the plaintiff in case he should fail to make amends as ordered.

Adoptio, adoption is the transfer of a person from the *potestas* of one man to that of another.

Adrogatio (arrogation), the oldest form of adoption, applicable only to adoption of persons *sui juris*. Originally it took place under the sanction of the pontifex, and in the *comitia curiata*, as an act of legislation.

Agnati, kinsmen related through males—kinsmen, as it were, on the father's side.

Bonorum possessio, 'possession of goods,' *i.e.*, the possession of the estate of a deceased person.

Caput, full legal status. Included three elements, freedom, citizenship, and family rights. The loss of the first two, or any change in respect of the third, involved respectively, *maxima*, *media*, or *minima deminutio capitis*.

Coemptio, a ceremony of marriage as though by mutual purchase (*co-emere*)

Cognitio, a summary proceeding or enquiry before a magistrate.

Condictio, the general term for a personal action, *i.e.*, an action against one or more persons in which the plaintiff alleges that something ought to be given to or done for him.

Confarreatio, a religious marriage ceremony.

Commercium, the right to transact business according to, and under the protection of the rules of Roman law.

Connubium, the right to contract a full legal marriage, giving rise to *patria potestas* over issue.

Fiducia, trust or confidence. *Lex fiduciae*, a provision accompanying a mancipation, embodying a trust for reconveyance of the property in a certain event.

Formula = the written issue or matter for decision remitted in an action by the prætor to the *judex*.

Furtum, theft: see p. 37. *Furtum manifestum* = theft where the thief is caught in the act.

Inædificatio, building on: used of one man erecting a building upon the property of another.

Interdictum, an order made by the Prætor ordering or forbidding something to be done.

Judex = the juryman or arbiter to whom cases were remitted for decision by the prætor. For many centuries only a senator could be selected as a *judex*, but towards the end of the Republic the class from whom *judices* might be selected was enlarged.

Jus tripertitum, literally = the threefold right or law: used to indicate a form of will in use under later Roman law, which had a threefold origin, resting, in part, on rules, in that regard, of (*a*) the old *jus civile*, (*b*) the prætor's edict, (*c*) imperial legislation.

Lex (1) a statute, (2) a special provision or condition accompanying a *mancipatio* or *nexum*.

Mancipium, *mancipatio*, a ceremony whereby ownership was transferred (manum capere), necessary in the case of certain things (*res mancipi*).

[1] I have to acknowledge the use I have made in this Glossary of some of the definitions in Professor Hunter's Introduction to Roman Law: (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1897).

Manus, the legal power of husband over wife (a word originally used, it would appear, to indicate full legal property or power of any kind over a thing).

Mortis causa, donatio mortis causa, a gift made on account of, or in the prospect of, supposed approaching death of the giver.

Nexum, originally the generic term for a sale by the copper and scales (*per æs et libram*). Afterwards confined to signify a contract by the like ceremony for repayment of a loan. Connected with a word meaning 'to bind'. *Nexi*= those bound by a contract of this kind.

Patria potestas, the rights enjoyed by the head of a Roman family (*paterfamilias*) over his legitimate children.

Peculium, property which the owner of a slave allowed the latter to treat as though his own. *Actio de peculio et in rem verso*, an action against the owner of a slave, upon an obligation incurred by the latter, for the recovery to the extent of the slaves *peculium* and of any profit accrued to the owner.

Pecunia constituta, money appointed to be paid. *Pactum de constituto*, an agreement whereby one became a surety for the payment of the debt of another, in consideration of the creditor forbearing to sue.

Procinctu, a will *in procinctu factum* means a will made on the eve of battle, literally when the soldiers were girded up (*procincti*) for fight.

Res aliena, a thing belonging to another.

Tutela, guardianship; the public and unpaid duty imposed by the civil law on one or more persons of managing the affairs and removing the legal incapacities of a person *sui juris* under the age of puberty.

Universitas (1) a corporate body. *Res universitatis*, corporate property; (2) the totality or aggregate of rights and duties inhering in any individual man, and passing to another as a whole at once (*universitas juris*). The chief example is inheritance. Opposed to *res singulæ*, particular things or aggregates of things.

Usus, use, usage. Marriage by *usus*=marriage resulting from length of cohabitation. Also *usus*, a kind of personal servitude over property, see p. 28, *supra*.